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Will the PRIPs’ KID live up to its  
promise to protect investors? 
Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía 
n July 3
rd, the European Commission unveiled 
its  long-awaited  proposal  to  improve  the 
information  that  investors  receive  before 
purchasing a wide range of packaged retail investment 
products  (PRIPs).
1  This  so-called  ‘PRIPs  initiative’ 
represents  a  key  step  in  enhancing  the  protection  of 
retail  investors  and  advancing  the  single  market  for 
financial  services.  Under  the  Regulation,  every 
potential  investor would receive, at the point of sale 
and free of charge, a short ‘key information document’ 
(KID)  presenting  the  essential  characteristics  of  the 
product in plain language. 
The  field  of  application  of  the  KID  is  vast  and 
encompasses  investment  funds,  both  open-ended  and 
closed, including UCITS but also AIFs sold to retail 
investors;  unit-linked  insurance  products,  i.e. 
insurance  policies  whose  underlying  asset  is  an 
investment unit; and all sorts of structured products, 
whether packaged by banks, insurers or other agents 
(Art. 2). 
What will the KID look like? 
In  short,  a  KID  will  be  required  for  all  investment 
products that entail: i) investment risk for the buyer, 
meaning  the  payout  of  the  product  depends  on  the 
market  value  of  given  assets,  and  ii)  ‘packaging’, 
meaning  that  the  assets  are  not  held  directly  by  the 
investor  but  rather  are  the  underlying  or  reference 
assets to the end product. The KID will therefore not 
apply to plain-vanilla securities and bonds but to the 
products that ‘wrap’ those in one way or another. It is 
this element of ‘packaging’ that adds a further layer of 
complexity  and  justifies  a  higher  standard  of 
disclosure, not only in terms of risks but also in terms 
of costs.  
                                                   
1 Proposal for a Regulation on Key Information Documents 
for Investment Products, COM (2012) 352/0169. 
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whose surrender 




­  Structured products 
manufactured or sold 
by banks 









­  Individual pension 
products 
­  Securities that embed 
a derivative 
­  Investment products 
sold to institutional 
investors (e.g. 
professional AIFs) 
­  Investment products 
with no packaging (e.g. 
plain vanilla securities 
and bonds, under the 
Prospectus Directive) 
­  Traditional deposits 
­  Non-life insurance 
products and protection 
insurance products 
­  Occupational pension 
schemes under 
Directive 2003/41/EC 
­  Pension products for 
which a financial 
contribution from the 
employer is required 
and where the 
employee has no 
choice as to the 
provider 
 
The KID standard will be similar to the UCITS’ KIID 
(key investor information document) but re-formulated 
to  accommodate  the  diverse  range  of  products  that 
qualify as PRIPs. The objective of the KID is two-fold: 
i) to allow a comparison between products within the 
same category, for instance between fund A and fund 
B,  and  ii)  to  allow  a  comparison  between  different 
categories  of  products,  for  instance  between  fund  A 
and insurance policy C. The document will give clear 
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answers  to  pertinent  questions  such  as:  What  is  this 
investment? What are the risks and what might I get 
back?  What  are  the  costs?  Responses  to  these 
questions are to be spelled out under separate headings 
(Art. 8). 
The KID  will  help consolidate the single  market for 
financial  services.  It  does  not  equal  a  marketing 
passport  but  the  document  will  be  fully  harmonised 
and valid across the Union – under a regulation rather 
than a directive. It will just need to be translated into 
the  local  language  of  each  member state where  it  is 
marketed. Currently, pre-contractual disclosure is not 
harmonised in the EU except for UCITS funds. Some 
member  states  have  acted  to  fill  this  vacuum  and 
ensure investor protection but others have failed to do 
so.  This  patchwork  fragments  the  single  market  and 
makes  competition  among  product  providers  more 
difficult, resulting in higher costs for investors. 
At  first  sight,  the  KID  proposal  may  look  rather 
straightforward, but its complexity in practice should 
not be underestimated. It will require a fair amount of 
work by the Commission and ESMA to develop and 
enforce the full set of implementing acts and technical 
standards needed to put flesh on the KID. In particular, 
ensuring comparability across widely different product 
categories  may  turn  out  to  be  more  difficult  than 
initially  envisaged,  if  disclosure  is  to  be  meaningful 
and  not  misguiding.  Ill-devised  disclosure  could  end 
up  pushing  investors  towards  certain  product 
categories instead of others. Such an outcome could be 
potentially harmful for the individual investor but also 
entail unintended effects for financial stability and the 
financing of the real economy.  
What about non-conventional risks? 
To provide meaningful information to investors, it is 
very  important  to  emphasize  the  disclosure  of  non-
conventional risks, also called non-market risks, such 
as  operational,  counterparty  and  liquidity  risks. 
Focusing solely on market risks may misrepresent the 
real risk in most investment products. Both the PRIPs 
KID proposal and the UCITS’ KIID are disappointing 
in  this  respect.
2  The  insufficient  attention  paid  by 
regulators  to  non-conventional  risks  may  well  be 
explained by the difficulty in measuring or otherwise 
representing them. Market risks are easier to express in 
numbers – although standard metrics are based on past 
performance and usually underestimate the probability 
of  exceptional  market  circumstances,  when  hidden 
non-market risks become the most relevant.  
                                                   
2  It  should  be  noted  that  Art.  8.5  of  the  UCITS  KIID 
Regulation (583/2010) requires the disclosure (in a narrative 
form)  of  any  specific  credit,  liquidity,  counterparty  and 
operational risks, as well as the impact of using derivatives 
on  the  risk  profile.  However,  there  is  no  specific 
implementation or guidance in this respect. It is uncertain to 
what extent this disclosure takes place in practice. 
The KID will feature warnings in relation to specific 
non-conventional  risks  (Art.  8.2.e).  But  for  such 
warnings  to  be  meaningful,  thorough  work  will  be 
needed to categorise such specific risks in practice and 
devise the standard warnings. The regulatory process 
will  need  to  go  beyond  the  statement  of  high-level 
principles to ensure meaningful disclosure in practice. 
At the same time, warnings about specific risks may be 
of  little  help  to  investors  attempting  to  make 
comparisons across different products, let alone across 
different  product  categories.  Such  comparability  can 
be achieved via some form of graphic presentation of 
disclosure – similar to the illustrative chart below. An 
alternative proposal  has been to  capture the  level  of 
non-market risks in the form of a rating. 
Example of graphical disclosure of non-market risks 
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Operational Risk           
Liquidity Risk           
 
Where market risks are transformed and repackaged, 
resulting in novel operational, counterparty or liquidity 
risks, it is crucial to clearly communicate these non-
conventional risks to  investors. Otherwise, they  may 
be lured into more complex products that may possibly 
exhibit  a  smoother  pattern  of  returns  but  also  carry 
hidden  risks  that  later  materialise,  in  stark  contrast 
with investor expectations. At the same time, failure to 
communicate  non-market  risks  to  investors  may 
privilege products based  on complex  derivatives and 
structured  financial  instruments  that  increase  the 
interconnectedness  and  complexity  of  the  overall 
financial system, to the detriment of financial stability. 
An ambitious but challenging proposal? 
Beyond  non-conventional  risks,  the  KID  proposal  is 
ambitious when it comes to the content of disclosure. 
It  is  worth  noting  the  emphasis  on  disclosing  two 
respects:  the  recommended  minimum  holding  period 
and  the  liquidity  profile  of  the  product  (Art.  8.2.d). 
Information on these two aspects is rather lacking in 
the  UCITS’  KIID,  probably  due  to  the  legal 
requirement  for  UCITS  to  be  highly  liquid  and 
repurchase or redeem units at the request of investors 
(Art. 84, Directive 2009/65/EC).
3 Investment horizons, 
                                                   
3 UCITS managers are obliged to warn investors that “this 
fund  may  not  be  appropriate  to  investors  who  plan  to 
withdraw their money within [period of time]” only if they 
consider a minimum holding period is an essential element 
of the investment strategy (Art. 7.2.f, Regulation 583/2010). 
The PRIPs’ KID should avoid using such negative phrasing, 
which  may  misrepresent  to  investors  the  importance  of Will the PRIPs’ KID live up to its promise to protect investors? |3 
however, are an  essential  element  in any  investment 
decision.  It  has  been  argued  extensively  that  very 
liquid products may not always be in the best interest 
of investors.
4  
The  UCITS’  KIID  was  introduced  for  new  funds  in 
July 2011 and for all existing funds in July 2012. The 
European  Commission  has  therefore  deemed 
appropriate  to  award  a  grace  period  to  UCITS 
managers  who  will  not  need  to  produce  the  PRIPs’ 
KID during the first five years after the adoption of the 
KID  Regulation.  While  it  is  sensible  to  delay  the 
introduction of the KID for UCITS who just produced 
their KIID, it undermines the essential objective of the 
PRIPs initiative, namely to allow comparability across 
different  product  categories.  The  two  aspects 
mentioned  above,  holding  periods  and  liquidity 
profiles,  are  just  examples  of  key  information  that 
investors  will  not  be  able  to  compare.  It  would  be 
sensible to introduce the KID earlier for new UCITS 
funds.  After  the  five-year  transition  period,  the 
UCITS’ KIID should disappear and all pre-contractual 
disclosure  should  fall  under  the  same  piece  of 
legislation – it is worrying that the Commission is not 
certain about following this path.
5 
                                                                                      
investment  horizons.  Disclosure  of  this  essential  element 
should be phrased proactively in all instances. 
4  See  Mirzha  de  Manuel  Aramendía  and  Karel  Lannoo, 
Rethinking Asset Management: From Financial Stability to 
Investor  Protection  and  Economic  Growth,  ECMI-CEPS 
Task  Force  Report,  April  2012  (http://www.ceps.eu/book/ 
rethinking-asset-management-financial-stability-investor-
protection-and-economic-growth). 
5  The  European  Commission  envisages  at  least  two 
possibilities after the five-year transition period: i) maintain 
the UCITS’ KIID, perhaps aligning it with thePRIPs’ KID 
or  ii)  repealing  the  UCITS’  KIID,  subjecting  UCITS 
toPRIPs’ KID, and possibly reforming the PRIPs’ KID (see 
p. 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the PRIPs’ KID 
proposal). 
Further evidence of ambition in the PRIPs proposal is 
the  space  reserved  in  the  KID  for  responsible 
investment  products  to  be  featured  as  such.  It 
envisages  the  summary  disclosure  of  the  specific 
environmental, social or governance (ESG) objectives 
and the means to achieve them (Art. 8.2.b.iii). The idea 
is laudable but, once  more,  it  will  demand thorough 
work  from  regulators  and  supervisors  to  make  sure 
ESG branding is not used as a mere marketing tool. 
Harmonising pre-contractual disclosure before creating 
an EU framework for responsible investment products 
may not work well in practice. 
Overall, the KID is a good proposal but pre-contractual 
disclosure is just one of the pieces in the jigsaw puzzle 
of investor protection. The Commission points out that 
it  should  be  read  alongside  the  reform  of  selling 
practices  in  MIFID  and  the  IMD.  Regrettably,  the 
proposals  have  been  far  less  ambitious  in  this  latter 
respect – and risk being furthered watered down by the 
European Parliament. It somehow looks as if the EU 
will  place  all  the  eggs  of  investor  protection  in  the 
basket of pre-contractual disclosure. It simply will not 
work. 